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Constituting American Masculinity
Jeff Osborne
 Narratives of the American eighteenth century almost always turn around 
the rejection of paternal authority and the practice of deference.1 Connecting the 
antipaternalistic themes of Enlightenment thought to the rhetoric of the Ameri-
can Revolution, Jay Fliegelman writes: “At every opportunity Revolutionary 
propogandists insisted that the new nation and its people had come of age, had 
achieved a collective maturity that necessitated them becoming in political fact 
an independent and self-governing nation” (3-4). The intensifying critiques of 
patriarchy, borrowed from Locke and the republican tradition, that developed in 
avenues as varied as pedagogy and politics were, according to Fliegelman, the 
essence of a “cultural revolution . . . in the understanding of the nature of author-
ity that affected all aspects of eighteenth-century culture” (5). The importance 
of Fliegelman’s analysis is that he traces the diffusion of paternal authority from 
a rationalistic social order to affective bonds, indicating along the way that the 
care and affection that defined the “new” father’s authority did not make him 
any less authoritative.
 Although in the wake of the Revolution democratic local-level social rela-
tions moved toward displacing and replacing colonial forms of paternal authority, 
the Federalist nationalist program of the 1780s aimed to reassert such authority’s 
power, albeit in new form.2 In other words, despite the cultural revolution Flieg-
elman identifies, “the rebellion of sons did not eliminate the need for patriarchal 
authority” (Kimmel 19), and the rejection of paternal authority in the name of a 
new fraternity was not decisive.3 Rather the Revolution’s sacrifice of the father 
cleared the way for a new form of paternal authority, a passage from an explicit 
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and hierarchical patriarchal control to a more subtle and institutionalized network 
of control only disguised as “fraternal.”4 By subjecting the populace to their 
desire for security, the Federalist project converted citizens as a heterogeneous 
collective into “the people” as a virtualized concept void of difference, reinvest-
ing the ideal of the father in the fantasy of the people as a unified, fraternal, and 
contractual whole.5 
 If we attend to the ways eighteenth-century American men deployed repub-
lican ideology in their efforts, first, to conceptualize the American Revolution 
and, then, to participate in the heated debates over the constitution, we can bet-
ter understand how the concept of masculinity (or, to put it in the language of 
republican virtue, manliness) functioned to perpetuate paternal control. In other 
words, resolving the paternalistic paradox—how the political desire that initially 
aimed at undermining paternal and patriarchal authority during the Revolution 
transformed into a desire to revive, even if in new form, that same authority 
during the constitutional period—requires that we explore two transformations 
that occurred during the last half of the eighteenth century. First, we need to 
understand how the republican tradition did not represent an intact and univocal 
voice in early America. Instead, we need to explore how the colonists’ rhetorical 
deployment of republican ideals changed from the revolutionary period to the 
constitutional period. Political theorists and historians like Sheldon Wolin, Saul 
Cornell, Ruth Bloch, and Christopher M. Duncan argue that the use of republican 
theory during the 1760s and 1770s functioned alongside a fairly radical egalitar-
ian and democratic theory of political participation and that it was only in the 
Federalists’ nationalist desires that republican theory in America was decoupled 
from this theory. Second, we need to trace within this ideological transforma-
tion a collateral rhetorical transformation in the use of concepts of masculinity. 
In the revolutionary period the notion of manliness remained fiercely coupled 
to the republican insistence upon liberty. In the often volatile debates over the 
constitution, however, the notion of manliness underwent a necessary change 
in the rhetoric of the Federalists. The proponents of national government had to 
overcome the idea of manliness as liberty from subordination precisely because 
the rhetoric of their nationalist program had to define liberty by way of the secu-
rity of political subordination. In short, although notions of masculinity used by 
both sides during the ratification debates often drew upon the same republican 
tradition, I intend to argue that there were significant differences between the 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists in both the rhetorical use of masculinity and its 
meaning.6 
 These differences did not always exist. For instance, during the revolution 
the rhetoric of ministers and pamphleteers emphasized the masculine qualities of 
republican virtue, distinguishing masculine virtue from effeminate corruption. As 
Ruth Bloch writes, “Public virtue was indeed possible for exceptional women, 
but it was never an inherently feminine characteristic” (42). In the Federalist 
Papers, too, Publius often figures America as a passive, diseased, and feminine 
body. Connecting Publius’s rhetoric to the logic of coverture, Dana D. Nelson 
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argues that the Federalist impulse toward unity suggests that a subordinated body 
politic is preferable to disorderly passions, that the country’s constituents, like 
married women, need to be held in their place by the authority of men (42-46). 
In a most telling passage, Alexander Hamilton compares the political disorder 
of America to the inappropriate and damaging influence of Mme. de Maintenon, 
the Duchess of Marlborough, and Mme. de Pompadoure when he invokes “the 
influence which the bigotry of one female, the petulancies of another, and the 
cabals of a third, had in the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications 
of a considerable part of Europe” (23). Opposed to the corrupting influence of 
feminine passions, stood the model patriot who, as Ruth Bloch writes, “was 
frequently described according to classical republican ideals as a heroic orator 
or citizen-soldier” (44). For instance, Joseph Warren describes “fathers / looking 
/ . . . with smiling approbation on their sons who boldly stand forth in the cause 
of virtue” (quoted in Bloch 44). While republican ideology was by no means 
perfectly unified or uniform across the colonies, those resisting the British sub-
jugation had a shared understanding of republicanism’s anti-authoritarianism 
and anti-paternalism. In The Rights of Colonies Examined, Stephen Hopkins 
articulates the logic of American freedom as the absence of political subordina-
tion: “Liberty is the greatest blessing that men enjoy, and slavery the heaviest 
curse that human nature is capable of. . . . [T]hose who are governed by the will 
of another, or of others, and whose property may be taken from them by taxes or 
otherwise without their own consent and against their wills are in the miserable 
condition of slaves” (507-8). James Otis, also connecting political subordination 
to slavery, declares, “The people never entrusted any body of men with a power 
to surrender [their liberty] in exchange for slavery” (443). If we consider these 
pamphlets alongside a pamphlet like Paine’s Common Sense or Pennsylvania’s 
Paine-inspired constitution, we recognize that republican theory intermingled 
with the theory of direct democracy during the revolutionary period.
 As Christopher M. Duncan so cogently argues, the republicanism of the 
Revolutionary and confederacy periods was a much more radical republican vi-
sion than the one ultimately taken up by the Federalists. In fact, the Federalists 
ideology represents a substantial transformation in republican thinking, away 
from a participatory model of civic life toward a more paternalistic one. The 
division in republican thinking during the constitutional period can be roughly 
assigned to the major division in political theory, that between the Federalists 
and the Anti-Federalists.7 As part of the argument over the constitution, the two 
antagonists deployed differing rhetorics of masculinity. Whereas republican mas-
culinity as reflected in the revolutionary pamphlets and in speeches and written 
texts by Anti-Federalists like Patrick Henry and Centinel aimed to oppose and 
subvert paternal authority, the rhetoric of masculinity deployed by the Federalists 
was a rhetoric of political subordination that lent itself to the larger paternalis-
tic argumentative structure of their project. As important, then, as the explicit 
arguments made and their rhetorical intent, is what lies beneath them, surfacing 
only occasionally, but always an informing presence. Both sides of the debate 
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understood that manly strength served as a powerful and popular metaphor for 
government; Federalist and Anti-Federalist alike often structured their descrip-
tions in terms of the effects the constitution would have on the masculinity of 
the republic. Thus, each vote was, in some sense, implicated in a choice among 
competing masculinities. Because masculinities are always co-founded with 
compatible forms of power and the signifiers that compose the social and moral 
institutions which comprise their conditions of possibility, the debate was able 
to recraft masculinity and its insecurities and make them fit to new languages 
of political action, a new regime of signifiers constellated alternatively around 
patriotic virtue, the threat of insecurity, and the salvation of unity.
Masculine Binds
On 28 October 1787, in a letter written during the heat of post-Con-
tinental Convention debate, James Madison shared an insight into the power 
politics of the ratification process with his longtime friend George Washington: 
“There is at present a very strong probability that nine States at least will pretty 
speedily concur in establishing [the Constitution]. What will become of the tardy 
remainder? They must be either left as outcasts from the Society to shift for 
themselves, or be compelled to come in, or must come in of themselves when 
they will be allowed no credit for it” (Washington 5: 391). Madison’s take on 
the implications a ratifying majority would have for nonratifying states evokes 
much of the floating anxiety shadowing the constitutional debates. Although the 
Federalist proponents of the constitution were fairly confident that the document 
would, indeed, be ratified, they were uncertain about the effects such ratification 
would have on the new American democratic experiment and the constitutional 
ideal of union. How could the Federalists reconcile the coercive force of a rati-
fying majority with the actual choice of ratification? In other words, if states 
chose to ratify only because they felt threatened, how could this in any way be 
called a choice?
 Beginning in 1786, when the states failed to recognize and abide by the 
peace treaty with Great Britain, anxieties over the “passions” involved in state 
politics intensified, culminating in reactions to several political and social rebel-
lions, most notably Shays’s rebellion in Massachusetts. Those favoring a national 
government that would curb the emotional constituents of confederated America 
by establishing “some disinterested & dispassionate umpire in disputes between 
different passions” (Madison to Washington, 16 April 1787; Washington 5: 146) 
perceived the potentially rupturing force of this “passionate” political and social 
desire as a threat to the kind of freedom (of security, of property, of prosperity) 
that, for them, the revolution had taken as its object. They keenly felt the need in 
the face of what they often described as “madness,” “absurdity,” and “anarchy” 
to establish, in the words of Washington in a 1786 letter to John Jay, a “coercive 
power”:
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We have probably had too good an opinion of human nature 
in forming our confederation. Experience has taught us, that 
men will not adopt & carry into execution, measures the best 
calculated for their own good without the intervention of a 
coercive power. . . . To be fearful of vesting Congress . . . with 
ample authorities for national purposes, appears to me the very 
climax of popular absurdity and madness. (4: 212)
The power of constituting social and political relations, in this vocabulary, would 
no longer be an attribute of the people (their attributes are here reduced to an 
adolescent and rebellious irrationality governed by passions); rather, the people 
ought to be coercively formed through the energy of an authoritative congress 
possessed of an abstractly rational and paternalistic power. A national govern-
ment would know best what is good for the people, know best how to judge the 
people, know best how actually to constitute a good people.
 The Federalists deploy within their rhetorical-political program the strategic 
force of a ratifying majority to threaten the politically constituting interests of the 
people, interests that Madison-as-Publius seems to advocate with so much protec-
tive care in the Federalist Papers. In this letter to Washington, however, Madison 
harnesses political power and its effects to the threat of greater force rather than 
to rational democratic dialogue. Madison’s and Washington’s principles in these 
letters (and in Madison’s letters to Jefferson, Hamilton, and others) violate those 
carefully constructed principles of republican democracy soon to be advocated 
in the Federalist series. As represented in Madison’s epistolary rhetoric, the nine 
potential ratifying states exert a force characterized by its sovereign power over 
the four minority “remainder” states (Virginia, Rhode Island, North Carolina, 
and New York). This is especially evident in Madison’s use of the term outcasts, 
which barely disguises in its passive form the power of the sovereign to banish. 
Only a few weeks from the publication of the first Federalist paper, security (or, 
rather, the threat of insecurity) becomes one of the primary motives the support-
ers of the constitution attach to their rhetoric.8
 According to Madison, two inducements exist for the potentially “tardy” 
states to join the Union. There is, first of all, the insecurity and apprehensive-
ness associated with becoming “outcasts.” In this instance, the nine united states 
stand as a threat to these individual states as both a physical and economic force: 
according to Madison, this “Union” of states is one which would not be willing 
to “share its common fortunes” (391) with the “remainder” states (remainder 
suggesting, before the event of union, that these states are ideally subtracted out 
of the future union’s ledger, another act of sovereign power barely concealed 
beneath Madison’s rhetoric). In addition to suggesting the humiliation faced 
by states who would join the union “when they will be allowed no credit for 
it,” Madison, in the very next sentence, makes clear the consequences for the 
hesitating states: “Can either of these situations be as eligible as a prompt and 
manly determination to support the Union. . . ?” (391). That they hesitate already 
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suggests, Madison insinuates, something other than “manly determination.” At 
stake in the Federalist threat of insecurity, then, and what stands to be discredited, 
is the republican ideal of masculine honor and dignity, “manly determination.” 
In this way, Federalist rhetoric appeals to convention members by threatening 
not only political and financial, but also psychical castration. And failing to 
embrace the constitution only creates the threat of further shame; these states 
ought, instead, to develop the “manly determination” necessary for a quick and 
unhesitating ratification.
 Between these two inducements, though they seem perfectly compatible, 
there is a subtle yet powerful contradiction. While the choice involved in the 
second inducement is clear (have the manly determination to join the union or 
face castrating shame and humiliation), Madison’s insight into the motives for 
states actually to ratify the constitution (the “tardy” states would rather join than 
become threatened outcasts), injects the manly act of ratification with a certain 
amount of ambiguity. Is this manly determination determined by the preexist-
ing manliness of each state? Or is it, instead, determined, retroactively, by fear 
of shame and/or isolation, an acknowledgment of weakness, rather than manly 
strength? Yet this latter would mean that the states somehow lacked the fortitude 
and resolve necessary to stick it out alone which would point to something, in 
the end, rather unmanly (at least according to Madison’s use of it here). In this 
way, Madison attaches masculinity to the constitution through a rhetorical double 
bind. The “manliness” Madison traps in the Federalist double bind is that heroic, 
self-determining, free and virtuous manhood of the republican tradition that, 
through the revolution, succeeded in overcoming British monarchy and what the 
revolutionaries saw as its corrupting political structures. The political rhetoric 
of the revolution often connected this republican masculinity to the republican 
tradition’s characterization of the autonomous citizen as free, as the obverse of 
enslaved, as pamphleteers urged colonists to rally around the notion that British 
rule subordinated American men to the status of slaves. In other words, even as 
Madison evokes republican manliness, he undermines it in what he calls it to 
do: to subordinate itself to the nationalist project under the duress of threat.
 In a letter to his nephew, Bushrod, George Washington underscores the logic 
contained in Madison’s masculine double bind when he speculates on the con-
sequences for Virginia if it should refuse to join the union. Virginia’s opponents 
to the proposed constitution should be asked, Washington writes, “What line of 
conduct they would advise [Virginia] to adopt, if nine other States should accede 
to [the constitution], of which I think there is little doubt? Would they recommend 
that it should stand on its own basis—separate and distinct from the rest? . . . 
or will they advise a return to our former dependence on Great Britain for their 
protection & support? or lastly would they prefer the mortification of coming 
in, when they will have no credit there from?” (5: 422). Washington understands 
perfectly the power of Madison’s emasculating double bind. The choice isn’t be-
tween manly independence and manly embrace of the union, but a choice among 
dependencies: upon whom will Virginia be dependent? Accession to political 
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power, Washington argues, requires a passage through the subordinating logic 
of the Oedipal myth, and the gift of masculine strength and dignity proffered by 
a national government requires, however disavowable or disavowed, castrating 
dependency. To demonstrate that recommending independence (recommending 
that Virginia “should stand on its own basis”) is not a choice for the delegates, 
Washington questions his state’s “standing” in terms of its strength (or lack 
thereof): “I am sorry to add . . . that Virginians entertain too high opinion of the 
importance of their own Country. In extent of territory—In number of Inhabitants 
. . . & In wealth I will readily grant that it certainly stands first in the Union; but 
in point of strength [Washington emphasizes this quality], it is, comparatively, 
weak” (422). Virginia’s lack of strength, its comparative weakness (compared 
to what? to the nine acceding states taken together? to other individual states? 
or to some ideal of masculine potency?) precludes its ultimate autonomy and 
independence. Its flaccidity, its inability to “stand on its own basis,” renders it no 
choice, according to Washington, other than dependence. No matter what Virginia 
and the rest of the hesitating states decide with regard to the constitution, this line 
of argument (first on the part of Madison, then Washington) suggests, they have 
no self-determination regarding their masculinity—only the union can bestow 
that upon them, though (for this very reason) only in an intensely ambiguous 
fashion. Their hesitation has already trapped them in a form of political emas-
culation—doubly so: first, because hesitation is opposed to manly determination 
and, thus, signifies a castrated faculty of decision, but also because the states’ 
hesitation means that “manly determination” is forever deferred. If they join the 
union, they will appear to do so only out of fear; and if they refuse, they will be 
shamed by the greater power of the joined states. Curiously (for such defenders 
of republican strength), autonomy, especially (masculine) independence, is not 
an option.
 In fact there seems little choice at all. Choice here is coerced by physical, 
economic, and psychical force: the real physical and economic threat of a majority 
of states united, standing over the comparatively weaker nonunited states; and the 
threat to what the Federalists have redefined as the preeminent characteristic of 
political action—manliness. A more deliberative, participatory determination with 
its hesitations, its characteristic moments of indeterminacy wrought by reflection 
and a respect of difference, becomes within the Federalists’ redoubtable logic 
a sign of an irremediable castration, an indication of a lack of fortitude. That is 
why for Washington the moment of decision revolves around the question of 
physical strength rather than politically efficacious reflection. Exemplifying one 
of the primary rhetorical postures of the Federalists, these letters suggest that 
embracing the union is the only choice and the only manly act available. The 
rhetorical move of the Federalists’ bribe which offers the seductive allure of force 
(strong, potent, manly) in union over the weakness of confederation implicates 
the very manly virtue it promises in a logical impossibility as it rearranges the 
terms ordinarily associated with masculine potency—substituting dependency 
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and union for independence and autonomy—at the same time that it legitimates 
manly determination as political action at the expense of democratic decision.
 The Federalist political paradigm, thus, simultaneously reinvents the concept 
of manly determination and the concept of civic duty, though not simply in the 
sense that civic virtue is expressed as masculine potency. After all, the republican 
tradition consistently weds together masculine and civic virtue. The Federalists’ 
deployment of republican ideals to argue for a form of authoritarian rule that bore 
a close resemblance to the authoritarian rule these very ideals had been deployed 
against during the rhetorical campaign against Britain invents both a new civic 
rationality and a new ideal of masculine virtue by proffering their possibility only 
in constitutional ratification. Although civic and masculine virtue are beckoned 
to in the call to unify, the rhetoric insists that such virtue exists only at the mo-
ment the call is answered affirmatively. The moment the nation is unified under 
the constitution, those previously gathered under the heterogeneous forms of 
political and social practice become “the people,” legitimated as juridical and 
manly (though nonempirical and virtualized) subjects. In his reading of the con-
stitutional period, Michael Warner makes the case that the political practices of 
local groups were delegitimated, defined as extralegal from the standpoint of the 
law, in order to establish the legitimacy that the constitution offered Americans. 
Thus, the Federalists legitimate manliness as national manhood at the same time 
as they delegitimate the confederation. For Warner, ratifying the constitution “was 
the practical fulfillment of the necessary conditions under which the signifier 
of ‘the people’ could legitimate a juridical order” (102). The performativity of 
the law, acquired through the retroactive anachronism of “the people” as legiti-
mately juridical, coincides with the masculine performativity in Washington’s 
and Madison’s rhetoric of ratification. Legal legitimacy and masculine virtue are 
already present—but only in the future of national union. 
 Forming the coerced choice of ratification and guiding the Federalist program 
in general is the same useful contradiction that Madison’s and Washington’s let-
ters deployed. The Federalist art of persuasion implicitly relies on the threat of 
emasculating insecurity and the production of territorial anxiety at the same time 
that it promotes the masculine virtue of the document and those who support it. 
Thus, according to this reasoning, it isn’t that manly states may frankly embrace 
the union; such embrace is the only way the states can become manly. Saying yes 
to the constitution performs masculinity; declaring dependency on the erection of 
the union simultaneously enacts manhood: union is the only avenue to that sex 
which is one (or that sex which is one). This masculine double-bind consumes 
the history of the ratification process: manly acts are determined by a paradoxical 
flight from, yet into, dependency. In this way the masculine double-bind joins in 
and propels the constitution’s conversion of the people’s heterogeneous interests 
into the sterility of the “people” as virtualized juridical subject.
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Military Masculinity
 Looking back on the events of the late 1780s Elihu Hubbard Smith in his 
“Biographical Account of Lemuel Hopkins” recollected that “at the time of 
publishing ‘The Anarchiad,’ the American Republic was united but in name. 
. . . The primary design of our authors . . . [was] to apply the satiric scourge, 
and lash those into right conduct, who could not be led into it by persuasion 
and a sense of duty” (quoted in Bottorff vi-vii). And, in 1820, one of the poets 
responsible for The Anarchiad, John Trumbull, wrote in reference to the series 
of publications that constituted the poem: “The publications of these gentleman 
were supposed, at the time, to have had considerable influence on the public taste 
and opinions; and by the boldness of their satire, to have checked and intimidated 
the leaders of disorganization and infidel philosophy” (“Memoir” 21). The poem 
thus embodies the kind of coercive antagonism present in the letters I discuss 
above, an antagonism that, more effectively than rational political discourse, 
operates by force and violence on perceived immoral disorganization. As Robert 
D. Arner demonstrates, the poem depicts Federalism as an ideology shaped by 
crisis (234-35), representing the urgency with which the nationalists promoted 
military intervention in the social tensions spreading throughout the country. 
It is not so much foreign threat that intensifies the rhetoric of insecurity in the 
Federalist Papers, for instance, but the other inside: the people as other. This is 
why the people with all their discord must be converted into the constitution’s 
“We, the people,” making them resonate with the homogeneous model of legal 
legitimacy. 
 Even after the idealizing utopian rhetoric of Jay’s Federalist no. 2 with its 
“one connected country, one united people, with the same ancestors, speaking 
the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles 
of government, having similar manners and customs,” it is at bottom the forces 
of internal fragmentation that both define and threaten the confederated states 
for the Publius trinity and necessitate a reorganization of political power. Jay’s 
unity is an illusion not only because its artificiality is underscored by the sup-
posed “natural” fragmentation of neighbors, but also because it merely names a 
strategy of power to organize force. In no. 28, for instance, Hamilton declares 
that “Should such emergencies (seditions and insurrections) at any time hap-
pen under the national government, there could be no remedy but force” (134). 
“Who would not prefer that possibility,” he goes on to argue, “to the unceasing 
agitations and frequent revolutions which are the continual scourges of petty 
republics?” (135). This is the rationale, the rationality, of national union for 
Publius; forceful action defines the national government’s role “conducive to the 
prosperity and felicity of the people” (134). Opposing this role defines irrational-
ity itself: “it were irrational to believe that [the people] would be disinclined to 
its support” (134). That what the Federalists have in mind is other than social 
contract, general will, or fraternity (these are dreams in Hamilton’s reckoning) 
becomes absolutely clear in this letter: “[T]he idea of governing at all times by 
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the simple force of law . . . has no place but in the reveries of those political 
doctors, whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction” 
(134). Dr. Publius is much more pragmatic, much more realistic, his pragmatic 
realism diagnosing social difference as a disease in need of cure. “[S]editions 
and insurrections,” he prognosticates, “are unhappily maladies as inseparable 
from the body politic, as tumours and eruptions from the natural body” (134). 
These are “contagions” which “communicate” themselves and must be confronted 
by a medico-military force. The obsession with contamination, contagion, and 
communication colors much of the Federalist rhetoric not only in The Federalist, 
but also in the Connecticut Wits’ Federalist propaganda poem, The Anarchiad, 
which presents an overarching theory that men’s base passions are sources of a 
terminal and constitutional disease communicable to the apparatus of the state 
that need to be countered by a resurrected warrior-father.
 The Anarchiad was published under the pretense that it had been discov-
ered by an antiquarian society in an ancient fort taken to be further evidence 
of the existence of a “civilized people” (i.e. not Indian) in America predating 
the “discovery” of the New World. According to the mock preface, the survival 
of the manuscript itself through the wear of centuries becomes a symbol of the 
triumph of a divine and timeless Logos over the chaotic divisiveness of history 
(4). The fictional editor describes the poem as a kind of ur-poem, the source of 
all Western literature, and the poet, along with his people, the source of Western 
civilization: “Perhaps, in a future essay,” the fictitious antiquarian writes, “I shall 
attempt to prove that Homer, Virgil, and Milton, have borrowed many of their 
capital beauties from it” (5). In this way, the Anarchiad poets symbolized the 
political debates of the 1780s by situating them within a transcendent destiny 
originating with the discovered poem, a destiny that dictates retroactively the 
terms of the contemporary political situation.
 Ignoring the complexity of the social events that were shaping the trajec-
tory of the new nation, the poem seeks to frame the discussion of government 
within a mythologized history. Resurrecting the dead men of a lost but semidivine 
civilization, the Wits envision an America that isn’t a new world at all, but one 
that is older than the Old World itself, reinventing history as an a priori unity of 
tradition that is necessarily sheltered from the forces of decay and divisiveness. 
Establishing the contemporary situation as a war being waged by one part of soci-
ety over another, the Connecticut Wits long for the return of the strong sovereign 
father. Though the allegorical narrative is clumsy, awkward, and overloaded, it 
provides crucial insight into a Federalist psyche full of imperial dreams. They 
yearn for men who can re-create the lost age of great ancestors to wage war, once 
again, on the infidels of truth, who will demonstrate the imminence of the pres-
ent and carry out a millenary revenge to establish a new kingdom and institute 
a new patriarchal sovereignty. These new men will resurrect the glory of that 
ancient race, their ancestors, who were defeated by the savages the Europeans 
encountered in the earliest days of colonization. In other words, they will revive 
its imperial designs.
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 The poems began appearing in October 1786 and ran through September 
1787. Even at this early date, the poets responsible for The Anarchiad, Joel 
Barlow, Hopkins, David Humphreys, and Trumbull, had set their sights on the 
“scene of anarchy and confusion” that, in Trumbull’s view at least, threatened to 
“involve the country in the horrors of civil war” (“Memoir” 20). They considered 
themselves “friends of order, justice and regular authority” who “endeavoured to 
counteract this spirit by every effort in their power—by remonstrance, argument, 
ridicule, and satire” (20). Losing the virtuous political righteousness maintained 
during the revolution, the poets insist, the American patriots sink into a spiritual 
death, enabling mobs and factions to arise, like the living dead, to render chaos. 
In a speech by Anarch to Beelzebub, “for the purpose of persuading him to come 
over and help his faithful friends” (8), Anarch inverts one of Jesus’s central 
miracles, demonstrating the consequences of the spiritual death pervasive in the 
former colonies:
Near Hartford stream, where groves perpetual bloom,
And onion gardens breathe a glad perfume,
Though sunk in dust, to his own stench a prey,
Again our Laz’rus shall ascend to day;
Thy potent voice shall burst the deathful chain,
And raise him active in thy toils again. (9-10)
Anarch and Beelzebub’s Lazarus are the dead come to life, not as living, but as 
death itself, ascending into the paradisiacal Hartford, a contrary force to the per-
petual bloom of Connecticut life which embodies the organic order of traditional 
monarchical ideals. Symbolizing the antagonistic and corrupting political energy 
of New England, this Lazarus and his service to anarchy threaten not only the 
natural order, but nature itself.
 As anarchy spreads, contaminating the social body, America’s vital reason 
dissipates. The public mind succumbs to its diseased body leaving behind only 
a corpse:
Now sinks the public mind; a death-like sleep
O’er all the torpid limbs begins to creep;
While conscience, harrowing up their souls, with dread,
Their ghosts of empire stalks without a head. (20-21) 
To resurrect the union’s body from the living death of anarchy, Federalist mas-
culinity would need to include not only those attributes of power that would be 
ascribed to it by Madison, Washington, and Hamilton (coercive force, lack of 
difference, and dictatorial strength) but also a rigid and divine militarism:
Here shall I [Anarchy] reign, unbounded and alone,
Nor men, nor demons, shake my baseless throne;
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Till comes the day—but late, oh, may it spring—
When their tumultuous mobs shall ask a king;
A king, in wrath, shall heaven, vindictive send,
And my confusion and my empire end. (21-22)
Just as Jesus returns to earth as a vengeful force in the New Testament apocalypse, 
the savior of America must come “in wrath.” Perhaps that is why the Anarchiad 
poets choose Hesper, the Greek version of Lucifer, rather than the more conflicted 
figure of Jesus to duel with Anarchy: “In sun-bright robes, that dazzled as he trod, 
/ The stature, motion, armor of a god, / Great HESPER rose” (22).
 As defending warrior of America’s spirit, Hesper beckons to, not citizens 
in rational political debate, but militaristic force:
‘Bid other GREENES and WASHINGTONS arise!
Teach those who suffer’d for their country’s good,
Who strove for freedom, and who toil’d in blood,
Once more, in arms, to make the glorious stand,
And bravely die, or save their natal land.’ (23)
Revolutionary military heroes are summoned (some from the grave) to organize a 
militia against the political insurgents. The poets make clear that the meaning of 
the blood shed by those who fought in the Revolution is at stake in the decisions 
made in the constitutional convention. The Anti-Federalists are pitted against the 
summoned heroes in an allegorical replay of the War for Independence. They 
need to be taught how to again fight for freedom or face the wrath of a new force. 
Echoing the call to arms in Massachusetts to fight Shays, the poets describe the 
attributes of the force that will restore order in the convention:
‘Yes, they shall rise, terrific in their rage,
And crush the factions of the faithless age; . . . 
Restore the reign of order and right,
 And drive thee [Anarchy], howling, to the shades of night.’ (23-24)
The Anarchiad poets ultimately hang their desire for a forceful government on 
the Philadelphia convention. Published on the eve of the assembly, the tenth 
poem of the series delineates exactly what was at stake for the advocates of 
a strong national union. The poets allegorize the convention as “the great and 
final conflict” between Anarch and the forces of order, as “Hesper [Hamilton] 
. . . makes his last solemn address to his principal counselors and sages, whom 
he had convened in Philadelphia” (54). Resurrecting the revolutionary dead, the 
poets locate the contemporary political struggle within a framework of imperial 
destiny, rewriting the meaning of the revolution in terms better fit to their agenda. 
A personified “splendid victory” bids “each glad State” “[t]o bliss unbounded 
stretch their ardent eyes, / And wealth and empire from their labor rise” (54-55). 
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America’s trajectory toward imperial wealth, imaged by the poets as its fate, is 
threatened so long as a national union is not achieved. And the protectorates of 
this destiny, the “slain . . . heroes” (55) and “veterans” (56) of the revolution, 
bear witness to and suffer at the sight of what the poets deem the “discord” of 
“Faction” (57):
Behold those veterans, worn with want and care,
Their sinews stiffen’d, silver’d o’er their hair;
Weak in their steps of age, they move forlorn,
Their toils forgotten by the sons of scorn;
This hateful truth still aggrevates their pain,
In vain they conquer’d! and they bled in vain! (56-57)
The forces of “Faction . . . riot” (57), yet before “union’d empire” is “lost in empty 
dreams” (58), the now enraged Revolutionary dead “descend” from heaven, aiding 
those, like them, who are “touch’d with heavenly fire,” to “pour just vengeance 
on their country’s foes” (58): “Each on his steed of fire . . . grasps his flaming 
sword: / The burning blade waves high, and, dipt in blood, / Hurls plagues and 
death on discord’s faithless brood” (58). Divine military muscularity defines the 
curative energy of union and stands as guardian of a healthy America’s impe-
rial destiny and protects the “freedom” (redefined as commercial freedom and 
freedom of military movement) the revolutionary fathers died for:
. . . know, ye favor’d race, one potent head
Must rule your States, and strike your foes with dread,
The finance regulate, the trade control,
Live through the empire, and accord the whole. (63)
These lines allegorize energetic government through unity as military might. The 
“potent head” will regulate and control, will “strike . . . foes with dread.” Only 
such a union could counteract what nationalists described as the diseased body 
of the confederation. The erection of a strong potent figure emblematizing the 
fiercely militaristic and vengeful resurrected revolutionary dead would sterilize 
the national body (the true, but retroactively attributed, destiny of the revolu-
tion), cleansing it of the symptoms of difference in order to advance toward its 
imperial destiny.
 In some sense, the logic of the Anarchiad is very different than the logic of 
the double-bind I describe in the first section. The manhood the Wits describe is 
a conquering manhood, fighting in grand republican style the forces of corruption 
in the body politic. Yet, the poem’s fantasy of the United States’ imperial destiny 
is hardly republican. Coupled with this fantasy is the figure of the revolutionary 
veteran citizen-soldier, but one drawn to extinguish the very democratic practices 
the revolution engendered. What appears in this poem, then, is a republican man-
hood turned against itself. How could one and the same “manly determination” 
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be called upon to both continue and resist the democratic practices of America 
under the confederation? In other words, how could both the Federalists and 
the Anti-Federalists appeal to republican manhood without producing in their 
rhetoric some fundamental difference? In the final section below, I want to argue 
that in the same way that the Federalists’ vision of an imperial extended republic 
violates traditional republican ideals about civic virtue, it is incompatible with 
traditional republican ideals about masculine virtue. More than that, though, I 
want to argue that beyond constraining the exercise of republican civic virtue, 
the constitutional moment reoriented the notion of masculinity itself.
The President’s Whip: Militant Paternalism
 That the ratification debate was infused with often competing concepts 
of masculinity—and its political, moral, and military potency—indicates the 
instability of the concept and the instability of men’s self-conception as men. In 
other words, that the Federalists repeatedly held out masculinity as something 
to be accomplished, rather than something simply to be, points to a fundamen-
tal cultural, if not individual, gender insecurity. By no means, however, were 
Madison, Washington, and other Federalists the only ones to cast the lure of 
masculinity into the political debates surrounding constitutional ratification. 
The Anti-Federalists often invoked masculine attributes to describe their favored 
form of government—small confederated republics—and alluded to a vision of 
masculinity whose attributes included autonomy, independence, self-reliance, 
and an antipaternalistic disposition. Patrick Henry, in the first of his two famous 
June speeches, equates “manly fortitude,” an entrenched masculinity threatened 
by Federalist encroachments, with the proper character of republics: “Here [the 
constitution] is a revolution as radical as that which separated us from Great 
Britain. It is as radical, if in this transition our rights and privileges are endan-
gered, and the sovereignty of the States be relinquished: And cannot we plainly 
see, that this is actually the case? . . . Is this . . . relinquishment of rights worthy 
of freemen? Is it worthy of that manly fortitude that ought to characterize re-
publicans” (Ketcham 200). Henry insinuates that the constitution’s construction 
of a national government threatens the “manly fortitude” developed in rejecting 
monarchy and which, thus, defines American republicans as “freemen.” Like 
Washington, Madison, and the Connecticut Wits, Henry beckons to manhood, 
but in his rhetoric the concept of manhood is put to the same use it was in the 
rhetoric of the revolution. Henry pits manhood (a manhood not unlike the Fed-
eralists’ manhood: one of “manly determination,” “manly fortitude”) against 
the subordination he sees in the constitution, arguing that the “relinquishment 
of rights” implied in a national government diminishes “manly fortitude” and is 
not “worthy of freemen.” The implication here is that insofar as the civic sphere 
imagined by the Federalists does not rise to the level required by virtuous men, 
is not “worthy” of them, it is not, properly speaking, manly. For Henry, weakness 
lies not in a lack of resolve to ratify the constitution. Rather, weakness abides in 
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those who are duped by Federalist ideology, who persist in a kind of republican 
false consciousness: “[A] number of the people of this country are weak enough 
to think these things are too true” (Ketcham 200).
 In Henry’s view, the artificiality of the Federalist argument lacks the strength 
of truth; or so he implies in a rhetorical gesture whereby he implicates the opposi-
tion in constructing “fashions.” He accuses the opposition of making him out to 
be old fashioned even as he argues that their position has no substance beyond 
the ornate refinements of sophistic argumentation which is more fashionable 
(and, by implication, more effeminate) than Henry’s manly attachment to rights: 
“Perhaps an invincible attachment to the dearest rights of man, may, in these 
refined enlightened days, be deemed old fashioned” (Ketcham 200). Republican 
manhood speaks old-fashioned common sense and is suspicious of “enlightened” 
political discourse which attempts to emasculate republican manhood by erecting 
“imaginary dangers” like Shays’s Rebellion to threaten its security: “On a fair 
investigation we shall be found to be surrounded by no real dangers. We have 
the animating fortitude and persevering alacrity of republican men to carry us 
through misfortunes and calamities. . . . it is the fortune of a free people, not to 
be intimidated by imaginary dangers. Fear is the passion of slaves” (Ketcham 
210).9 In other words, Henry penetrates the logic of the Federalist double-bind, 
recognizing in it the production of the very fear that it proposes to assuage. Ac-
cording to Henry, the false, emasculating Federalist ideology of insecurity, is 
meant to enslave republican men by intimidation. Through a logic of transitiv-
ity, Henry insinuates that whereas republican government is that of free people, 
the constitution represents a government for slaves. Although both sides would 
agree that republican concepts like “manly determination,” “manly fortitude,” 
and “liberty” over “slavery” are to be valued, it is clear that they disagree over 
the form of government to which these concepts are best suited.
 The Anti-Federalists thus also aimed to tap into masculine insecurities, 
into the fear that this enslaving Federalist logic and its consolidated government 
threatened to diminish the strength of republican men as it usurped their power 
to change government: “I have just proved,” Henry intoned, 
that one tenth, or less, of the people of America, a most despi-
cable minority may prevent [governmental] reform or altera-
tion [see note 2]. . . . When the people of Virginia at a future 
day shall wish to alter their Government, though they should be 
unanimous in this desire, yet they may be prevented therefrom 
by a despicable minority at the extremity of the United States: 
The founders of your own [Virginia] Constitution made your 
Government changeable: But the power of changing it is gone 
from you! Whither is it gone? It is placed in the same hands 
that hold the rights of twelve other States; and those who hold 
those rights, have right and power to keep them. (Ketcham 210)
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Again Henry poses the danger as an opposition between old-fashioned strength 
and enlightened ornamentation: “[The] power [of Virginia] is reduced to little 
or nothing: Their garrisons, magazines, arsenals, and forts, which will be situ-
ated in the strongest places within the States: Their ten miles square, with all the 
fine ornaments of human life, added to their powers . . . will reduce the power 
of the [states] to nothing. The voice of tradition, I trust, will inform posterity of 
our struggles for freedom” (Ketcham 211-12). For Henry the test of republican 
manhood is whether it can erect itself, armed with the truth, in opposition to this 
emasculating and mystifying Federal program, no matter how great the odds: 
“It is said that eight States have adopted this plan. I declare that if twelve States 
and an half adopted it, I would with manly firmness, and in spite of an erring 
world, reject it” (Ketcham 200). 
 In this analysis I do not mean to suggest that the entire ratification debate 
comes down to a question of whose definition of masculinity was more seductive. 
In fact, the rhetorical lure of masculinity generally plays merely an ancillary role 
in larger arguments about representation, taxation, and rights. At the same time, 
though, it is clear that beneath the arguments over the merits of the constitution 
masculine identity is at stake, that at least one of the fault lines of this American 
identity crisis runs right through men’s self-conceptions as men. In other words, 
insofar as each side appeals to republican manhood to embrace its aims and 
insofar as each side puts forward a very different vision of civic virtue to which 
that republican manhood will be coupled, the concept of republican manhood 
itself is at stake. As I argued above, that masculinity could be put to such varied 
uses and implicated in such varied visions indicates, at the very least, its lack 
of conceptual rigor if not a functional instability. Once these men decide on the 
Federalists’ nationalistic program with its paternalistic impulse, manhood will 
be affixed to the civic virtues it promotes and will thus, perhaps as an unintended 
consequence, eventually lose its republican meaning to the sometimes overt 
paternalism of the Federalist project.
 Perhaps no other figure embodies the ambivalence of national manhood 
than George Washington. On 30 October 1787, just days after reading Madison’s 
letter about manly determination, Washington received a letter from Gouverneur 
Morris in which Morris encourages him, in striking terms, to accept the national 
presidency once the constitution has been adopted. Underscoring the arguments 
made by recent scholars, Morris indicates the power Washington (indeed, his 
very name) held in the national imagination: “I have observed,” he writes, “that 
your Name to the new Constitution has been of infinite service. I am convinced 
that if you had not attended the Convention, and the same Paper had been handed 
out to the World, it would have met with a colder Reception, with fewer and 
weaker Advocates, and with more and more strenuous opponents” (Washington 
5: 399-400). This power associated with Washington’s name and figure yields 
enormous strategic value. Not only has Washington’s signature “been of infinite 
service,” but, Morris writes, “should the Idea prevail that you would not accept 
of the Presidency it would prove fatal in many Parts” (400). Thus, Washington 
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in many ways already unites the country, keeping its “many Parts” functioning 
together.
 Morris puts his finger on an aspect of Washington’s power, however, that 
goes beyond sympathetic or affectionate identification when he expresses his 
own cynicism about America’s constituents. Part of the value of Washington’s 
power, for Morris, is that it opposes what Morris defines as the weakness of hu-
man nature and its tendencies toward immorality: “[Y]ou will agree with me that 
Men must be treated as Men and not as Machines, much less as Philosophers, 
& least of all Beings as reasonable Creatures; seeing that in Effect they reason 
not to direct but to excuse their Conduct” (400). For Morris (and Morris is sure 
that for Washington, too), the people need a leader who will not excuse but will 
correct their conduct, a leader who knows what is best for them and who can 
shape their actions accordingly. Those sympathetic imaginary bonds between 
the people and the president must be tempered with a more coldly rational force. 
This is what makes Washington, in the words of Morris, “best fitted to fill that 
Office”:
Your cool steady Temper is indispensably necessary to give 
a firm and manly Tone to the new Government. To constitute 
a well poised political Machine is the Task of us common 
workmen; but to set it in Motion requires still greater Qualities.
. . . The Exercise of Authority depends on personal Character; 
and the Whips and Reins by which an able Character governs 
unruly steeds will only hurl the unskillful Presumer with 
more speedy & headlong Violence to the Earth. The Horses 
once trained may be managed by a Woman or a Child; not so 
when they first feel the Bit. And indeed among these thirteen 
Horses now about to be coupled together there are some of 
every Race and Character. They will listen to your Voice, and 
submit to your Control; you therefore must say I must mount 
this Seat. (400)
 Although Morris was not the first of Washington’s correspondents to associ-
ate him with the presidency, he was the first to offer an argument that Washington 
accept the office. And what an argument it is. This is not the feminized body 
of the sentimentally imagined Washington. Here he is still the general (in fact, 
Morris addresses him as general in his closing), a taskmaster presiding over the 
“common workmen,” the cold, hard stage driver with whip in one hand and a 
tight grip on the reigns with the other.10 Force again becomes the predominating 
theme of national unity to which the whole country, different as are its parts, must 
“submit.”11 Washington, “firm and manly,” will function as the mirror image for 
a strong and unified national imaginary, giving shape and lending totality to the 
factional and diverse body of the people. Washington’s image will realize Jay’s 
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depiction of a homogeneous America, and his voice will submit the polyvocality 
of the confederation to the control of a manly univocality. 
 The manly strength exerted by Washington supplements the rhetorical strat-
egy in the Federalists’ constitutional discourse and indicates a radical blind spot 
in the view that eighteenth-century America overwhelmingly rejected patriarchal 
authority. The form of control that Morris hears in Washington’s voice and sees 
in his strong grip enables him to forcefully occupy a position the demands of 
which cannot be performed by just anyone, however. Most who would assume the 
reigns of such authority would be “hurled” “violently” to the earth. In Morris’s 
rhetoric Washington assumes an Apollonian corona in contrast to the usurping 
Phaeton who, unable to subordinate the unruly steeds, and threatening order with 
conflagration, must be struck down. Only he who can force, by the violence of 
the whip, the heterogeneous components of the country into submission may 
securely lay claim to the office. Washington must “train” the unruly states and 
their diverse constituents before they can be controlled. And the strength and 
efficacy of his regimen would be such that even a “Woman” or “Child” could 
then manage them.
 Even if it calls men toward the assumption of a managerial ideal, as Dana 
D. Nelson argues in National Manhood, the constitution offers them this role and 
the promise of its security only through their subordination to the stern, authori-
tative control of a manly executive. In the end it is the power of Washington’s 
unified and unifying manly image and tone to release men from the anxious 
ambivalences of a masculinity caught in the double bind of political castration 
(that double bind created by Washington himself, along with his Federalist al-
lies) that signals the decades-long closure of any materially efficacious debate 
about democratic social relations in the early republic. The idea of security and 
of personal happiness was, for the American eighteenth-century man, forcefully 
bound to the progress of powerful and authoritarian manly state structures (es-
pecially the structure of the presidency as embodied by Washington), because 
these implied a stable social fraternity realized in and protected by the “manly 
tone” that emanated from nowhere but the state itself. The irresistible advance of 
the paternalistic institutions of the state and their installation at the heart of the 
very social relations they supplant was in large part permitted by the masculine 
fantasy of its own representation in a great man who might put to rest, once and 
for all, the anxieties induced by the question of manhood in America. Washing-
ton as president marks the obsolescence of any discourse about fraternal social 
relations outside the parameters of the paternal state and tacitly inscribes, albeit 
in negative, the anxiety of each man on the unified surface of the president’s 
image.
Notes
 1. Though their explanations differ, many scholars detail the diminishing practices of patronage 
and deference in colonial America in the years before and during the Revolution, including Gordon 
S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (1991); Joyce Appleby, Republicanism and 
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Liberalism in the Historical Imagination (1992); and, more recently, Michael Zuckerman, “Authority 
in Early America” (2003).
 2. There remains much scholarly debate about whether we can accurately describe these 
practices as democratic. Although historians generally assert that democracy did not function as a 
coherent and/or acceptable political model until the Jacksonian era, the idea and practice of popular 
democracy was actually quite common in the decades after the Revolution and, specifically, during the 
period of the constitutional debates. For instance, Saul Cornell identifies two prolific anti-Federalist 
writers, Centinel and Philidelphiensis, as representing the “voice of radical democracy” (99). Joshua 
Miller points to several groups that he argues practiced and promulgated radical and direct democracy: 
among others, the Revolutionary Party in Philadelphia, 1776, the North Carolina Regulators, and the 
people who lived in 1776 on the borders of Virginia and Pennsylvania and declared independence 
from those states (55-60). He, like Marc Kruman, also points to the Pennsylvania Constitutional-
ists as radical democrats (62). I use the terms “democracy” and “democratic” in the sense outlined 
by these scholars. See Sheldon Wolin, The Presence of the Past (1989); Marc Kruman, Between 
Authority and Liberty (1997); Joshua Miller, The Rise and Fall of Democracy in Early America, 
1630-1789 (1991); Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism & the Dissenting Tradition 
in America, 1788-1828 (1999); Ed White, “The Value of Conspiracy Theory,” (2002). Each of these 
scholars articulate eighteenth-century forms of democratic practice as developing and operating under 
concepts of representation that, even if not as coherent as “Jacksonian democracy,” do not easily 
map onto republican or liberal ideology.
 3. Washington Irving’s “Rip Van Winkle” provides a visual illustration of the post-Revolution-
ary substitution of one father for another. When Rip awakens after the war and returns to the village 
inn, it has been transformed: “He recognized on the sign, however, the ruby face of King George, 
under which he had smoked so many a peaceful pipe, but even this was singularly metamorphosed. 
The red coat was changed for one of blue and buff, a sword was stuck in the hand instead of a 
scepter, the head was decorated with a cocked hat, and underneath was painted in large characters, 
GENERAL WASHINGTON” (11). As Christopher Looby notes in his analysis of Irving’s fable, 
“The decisive detail is Rip’s recognition of the change as one of semiotic substitution, his immediate 
demystification of the new order of authority” (43). 
 4. See, e.g., Carol Patemen, who argues that the “momentous transition from the traditional 
to the modern world . . . involved a change from a traditional (paternal) form of patriarchy to a new 
specifically modern (or fraternal) form: patriarchal civil society” (35). For her, patriarchal power 
does not necessarily refer to societies where fathers rule. Rather patriarchal power captures the 
specificities of domination and subjection institutionalized in the structures of government and in 
the web of social knowledge and truths. Pateman explains that “[t]he forms of subjection specific 
to civil society are . . . developed by the complicity of subordinates as well as by force—complicity 
made all the easier . . . when consciousness is informed by patriarchal forms of liberty and equality” 
(51). The very concepts and practices that were evidence of patriarchy’s defeat (liberty and equal-
ity) are actually subsumed within a more normalized form of patriarchal power that pervades civil 
society. In other words, as Enlightenment critique rapidly dissipated traditional forms of authority, 
new networks of social control that defined individuals and their social relations assumed their place, 
operating through different tactics, but largely by the same paternalistic principles.
 5. See Joshua Miller, The Rise and Fall of Democracy in Early America, on the conflict 
between direct democracy and representation and the diminishment of the people’s capacity for 
political action in a national government (51-103). Miller also argues that the Federalist’s rhetorical 
conflation of democracy and popular sovereignty depended on the definition of “the people” as “we, 
the people of the United States,” rather than the citizens of towns, counties, and states (107). See 
also Antonio Negri, Insurgencies, for his analysis of the role played by the paternalistic Federalist 
rhetoric of insecurity in converting “the people” as a multitude into “the people” as a virtualized 
object of representation (see esp. 155-75). John Jay’s Federalist no. 2 most clearly represents the 
idealizing fantasy of unified coherence with its “one connected country, one united people, with 
the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same 
principles of government, having similar manners and customs.”
 6. My focus on the rhetoric of republican masculinity in revolutionary pamphlets and in 
the oral and written record of the constitutional debate, however, should not imply that I see early 
American ideology as monolithically republican. I recognize that the political ideas of the “founders” 
were often hybrid expressions of liberalism, republicanism, Puritanism, moral-sense philosophy, 
literary sentimentalism and a host of other competing theories. Yet, it is clear that the concepts of 
masculinity injected into the political opposition over the constitution are informed by the notion of 
republican virtue. As Hannah Pitkin argues, the very term virtue is rooted in manliness: “… [Virtú] 
derives from the Latin virtus, and thus from vir, which means ‘man.’ Virtú is thus manliness, those 
qualities found in a ‘real man’” (25).
 7. See David Held, Models of Democracy: “In America republican concepts remained 
contested, but their connotation shifted strikingly, and the meaning of the ideal of the active citizen 
was altered. In the debate surrounding the U.S. constitution, some of America’s ‘founding fathers’ 
repudiated ancient and renaissance republicanism and sought to initiate a new republican order for 
130  Jeff Osborne
a country with a large population, extended territory and complex commercial networks” (54-55). 
As Held points out, whatever democracy exists in Madison’s theory is a “protective democracy,” 
a first step toward liberal democracy (see 56-95). Antonio Negri adds an important point to Held’s 
description, arguing that “What becomes essential” to grasp in analyzing the constitutional period 
are “the reasons why American constituent power, which in the democratic period had adjusted its 
Machiavellan and Harringtonian strength to the new American relations, here changes nature and 
transforms freedom, shifting it away from its meaning as active participation in the government to 
a negative meaning—that of an action, or the fruition of its own good, under the aegis of the law” 
(158). See also Christopher Duncan and Joshua Miller.
 8. The effectiveness of this strategy is evident in that many of those who refused to support 
the document in Philadelphia later retracted that position, supporting the adoption of the unamended 
constitution because, as one of the original anti-Federalists, Edmund Randolph, governor of Virginia, 
put it, they “fear[ed] disunion, eight States having already ratified” (Ketcham 482).
 9. The Federalists would engage in similar feminizing tactics. See Smith-Rosenberg, 854-
56, for her analysis of Federalist attempts to characterize the Shaysites (and other rural debtors) as 
effeminate.
 10. One member of the Constitutional Convention compared the Federalists’ treatment of the 
nation to “a number of jockeys who had thirteen young colts to break; they begin with the appearance 
of kindness, giving them a lock of hay, or a handful of oats, and stroaking them while they eat, until 
being rendered sufficiently gentle they suffer a halter to be put around their necks” (qtd. in John C. 
Miller 173). Miller suggests that Hamilton’s approach, on the other hand, “was to break the spirit of 
these mettlesome colts with a whip and then lock them up in the stable” (173).
 11. Federalist newspaper editors converted Washington’s endorsement of the constitution into a 
threat. One editor attributed the following words (widely printed) to Washington: “Should the States 
reject this excellent Constitution, the probability is, an opportunity will never again offer to cancel 
another in peace—the next will be drawn in blood” (Jensen, Documentary History #233).
Works Cited
Appleby, Joyce. Republicanism and Liberalism in the Historical Imagination. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
Arner, Robert D. “The Connecticut Wits.” American Literature, 1764-1789. Ed. 
Everett Emerson. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977. 233-52.
Bloch, Ruth. “The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America.” 
Signs 13.1 (1987): 37-58.
Bottorff, William K. “Introduction.” The Anarchiad: A New England Poem by 
David Humphreys et. al. Gainesville, FL: Scholars’ Facsimiles, 1967.
Cornell, Saul. The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism & The Dissenting Tradition 
in America, 1788-1828. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1989.
Dowling, William C. “Joel Barlow and The Anarchiad.” Early American Lit-
erature 25 (1990): 18-33.
Duncan, Christopher M. The Anti-Federalists and Early American Political 
Thought. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1995.
Fliegelman, Jay. Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American Revolution Against Patri-
archal Authority, 1750-1800. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay. The Federalist Papers by 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay. Ed. Garry Wills. New 
York: Bantam, 1982.
Held, David. Models of Democracy. 3rd ed. Cambridge, England: Polity, 2006. 
Hopkins, Stephen. The Rights of the Colonies Examined. Revolutionary America, 
1750-1815: Sources and Interpretation. Ed. Cynthia Kierner. Upper Saddle 
River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003: 49-51.
Constituting American Masculinity  131
Irving, Washington. “Rip Van Winkle.” The Complete Tales of Washington Irving. 
Ed. Charles Neider. New York: Doubleday, 1975.
Jensen, Merrill, ed. The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitu-
tion. 23 vols. Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976-.
Ketcham, Ralph. The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Debates. 
New York: Penguin, 1986.
Kimmel, Michael. Manhood in America: A Cultural History. New York: Free 
Press, 1996.
Kruman, Marc W. Between Authority and Liberty: State Constitution Making in 
Revolutionary America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1999.
Looby, Christopher. Voicing America: Language, Literary Form, and the Origins 
of the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.
Miller, John C. Alexander Hamilton: Portrait in Paradox. New York: Harper, 
1959.
Negri, Antonio. Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State. Trans. 
Maurizia Boscagli. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
Miller, Joshua. The Rise and Fall of Democracy in Early America, 1630-1789. 
University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991.
Nelson, Dana D. National Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and the Imagined 
Fraternity of White Men. Durham: Duke University Press, 1998.
Otis, James. The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved. In Pam-
phlets of the American Revolution, vol. 1, 1750–1765. Ed. Bernard Bailyn. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. 440-57.
Pateman, Carol. The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism and Political 
Theory. Cambridge, England: Polity, 1989.
Pitkin, Hannah. Fortune Is a Woman. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984.
Smith-Rosenberg, Carol. “Dis-Covering the Subject of the ‘Great Constitutional 
Discussion.’” Journal of American History 79 (1992): 841-73.
Trumbull, John. “Memoir of the Life and Writings of John Trumbull, LL.D.” The 
Poetical Works: Two volumes in one. Germany: Georg Olms Verlagsbuch-
handlung Hildesheim, 1969.
Warner, Michael. The Letters of the Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere 
in Eighteenth-Century America. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.
Washington, George. The Papers of George Washington. Ed. W.W. Abbot and 
Dorothy Twohig. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992.
White, Ed. “The Value of Conspiracy Theory.” American Literary History 14.1 
(2002): 1-31.
Wolin, Sheldon. The Presence of the Past. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1989.
Wood, Gordon S. The Radicalism of the American Revolution. New York: Knopf, 
1992.
132  Jeff Osborne
Zuckerman, Michael. “Authority in Early America: The Decay of Deference on 
the Provincial Periphery.” Early American Studies 1.1 (2003): 1-29.
